Underrepresented Outperformers: Female legislators in the Chinese Congress. 2021. With Xinrui Feng and Mingxing Liu. [pdf]
This paper presents one of the first studies of the political behavior of female members of China's national legislature---the National People's Congress (NPC). Female legislators have consistently held about 20% of seats in the NPC in the past two decades because of a gender quota, but they sponsor about 44% of all legislative bills and more than half of bills relevant to women's rights and interests in the 12th NPC. Among sponsors, women on average sponsor more bills (4.8 bills) than men (3.1 bills). We propose three potential mechanisms that drive women's comparative productiveness: (i) women are more collaborative than their male colleagues; (ii) the gender quota and non-Communist Party quota produce a particularly active female group; and (iii) female leadership encourages female participation. Legislative plans show that bills sponsored by women are considered as important as those sponsored by men. We next analyze 2,366 bills submitted during the 12th NPC and show that female legislators are not only more engaged in women's issues; they are also disproportionately more active than men in the traditionally ``male dominated'' areas including economics and finance, foreign affairs, rural affairs and environmental issues. Our findings suggest that a socialist legacy alone does not narrow the political gender gap; underrepresented regime outsiders (women) have strategically used the ``double-quota'' system and collaborated to carve out a place to amplify their voices, outperform insiders, and shape the policy debate.
Stimulated Political Decisions: Local Leadership Turnover and Firm Subsidies in China. 2021. With Siyao Li. [ssrn][pdf] (R & R)
How do politicians distribute government resources in regimes with no electoral considerations? We propose that new politicians make decisions that minimize political risks by favoring politically important actors: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but they adjust their behavior as they learn about local conditions and establish personal ties with private businesses. Using firm-level subsidies data after the 2008 stimulus in China, we find that new provincial governors, immediately after taking office, distribute a significantly larger proportion of subsidies to SOEs relative to private firms. The effect gradually attenuates as new governors establish connections with private firms. This strategy proves to be politically effective, with governors who adopt such a strategy more likely to be promoted. Contrary to conventional wisdom that the state always favors state-owned firms, we show that SOEs benefit from government policies only in the short-run.
The Evolving Relationship between the Party and the Private Sector in the Xi Era. 2021. [pdf] (book chapter for edited volume The Party Leaders All: The Evolving Role of the Chinese Communist Party, forthcoming 2022, Brookings Institute Press)
This review essay evaluates the evolving relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the private sector with a focus on the Xi era. I argue that Xi's policy towards the private sector does not fundamentally depart from the previous two administrations. Since Xi took office, there has been a stronger party presence in the private sector, but not necessarily more direct influence in their business operations. While SOEs still enjoy favorable treatment, private firms have grown more profitable, more innovative, and more competitive globally. Statistics on the private sector growth show clear continuity instead of disruption, and a new wave of privately-owned national champions has emerged. As the party enters into its second century, it will continue to face serious challenges in further developing and managing the private sector. The party will have no choice but to deepen its market-oriented reform.
Protecting Property through Political Office in China. 2018. [pdf] [appendix]
How do entrepreneurs protect their property and grow their businesses in systems without secure property rights? I argue that Chinese private entrepreneurs seek public office to protect their property from government predation. Drawing on rich empirical evidence including in-depth interviews and a unique national survey, I show how Chinese entrepreneurs deter local officials from demanding bribes, ad hoc taxes, and other types of informal payments by securing seats in the local legislature and using their political titles to signal political capital. Using a national survey of Chinese private entrepreneurs from 2000 to 2012, I show that entrepreneurs who serve in the local legislature spend an average of 14.5% less on informal payments to local governments. A simple signaling game further demonstrates how entrepreneurs use their political titles to signal strong political capital and deter expropriation
This paper presents one of the first studies of the political behavior of female members of China's national legislature---the National People's Congress (NPC). Female legislators have consistently held about 20% of seats in the NPC in the past two decades because of a gender quota, but they sponsor about 44% of all legislative bills and more than half of bills relevant to women's rights and interests in the 12th NPC. Among sponsors, women on average sponsor more bills (4.8 bills) than men (3.1 bills). We propose three potential mechanisms that drive women's comparative productiveness: (i) women are more collaborative than their male colleagues; (ii) the gender quota and non-Communist Party quota produce a particularly active female group; and (iii) female leadership encourages female participation. Legislative plans show that bills sponsored by women are considered as important as those sponsored by men. We next analyze 2,366 bills submitted during the 12th NPC and show that female legislators are not only more engaged in women's issues; they are also disproportionately more active than men in the traditionally ``male dominated'' areas including economics and finance, foreign affairs, rural affairs and environmental issues. Our findings suggest that a socialist legacy alone does not narrow the political gender gap; underrepresented regime outsiders (women) have strategically used the ``double-quota'' system and collaborated to carve out a place to amplify their voices, outperform insiders, and shape the policy debate.
- Media Coverage: East Asia Hotspots
Stimulated Political Decisions: Local Leadership Turnover and Firm Subsidies in China. 2021. With Siyao Li. [ssrn][pdf] (R & R)
How do politicians distribute government resources in regimes with no electoral considerations? We propose that new politicians make decisions that minimize political risks by favoring politically important actors: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but they adjust their behavior as they learn about local conditions and establish personal ties with private businesses. Using firm-level subsidies data after the 2008 stimulus in China, we find that new provincial governors, immediately after taking office, distribute a significantly larger proportion of subsidies to SOEs relative to private firms. The effect gradually attenuates as new governors establish connections with private firms. This strategy proves to be politically effective, with governors who adopt such a strategy more likely to be promoted. Contrary to conventional wisdom that the state always favors state-owned firms, we show that SOEs benefit from government policies only in the short-run.
The Evolving Relationship between the Party and the Private Sector in the Xi Era. 2021. [pdf] (book chapter for edited volume The Party Leaders All: The Evolving Role of the Chinese Communist Party, forthcoming 2022, Brookings Institute Press)
This review essay evaluates the evolving relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the private sector with a focus on the Xi era. I argue that Xi's policy towards the private sector does not fundamentally depart from the previous two administrations. Since Xi took office, there has been a stronger party presence in the private sector, but not necessarily more direct influence in their business operations. While SOEs still enjoy favorable treatment, private firms have grown more profitable, more innovative, and more competitive globally. Statistics on the private sector growth show clear continuity instead of disruption, and a new wave of privately-owned national champions has emerged. As the party enters into its second century, it will continue to face serious challenges in further developing and managing the private sector. The party will have no choice but to deepen its market-oriented reform.
Protecting Property through Political Office in China. 2018. [pdf] [appendix]
How do entrepreneurs protect their property and grow their businesses in systems without secure property rights? I argue that Chinese private entrepreneurs seek public office to protect their property from government predation. Drawing on rich empirical evidence including in-depth interviews and a unique national survey, I show how Chinese entrepreneurs deter local officials from demanding bribes, ad hoc taxes, and other types of informal payments by securing seats in the local legislature and using their political titles to signal political capital. Using a national survey of Chinese private entrepreneurs from 2000 to 2012, I show that entrepreneurs who serve in the local legislature spend an average of 14.5% less on informal payments to local governments. A simple signaling game further demonstrates how entrepreneurs use their political titles to signal strong political capital and deter expropriation
