Underrepresented Outperformers: Female legislators in the Chinese Congress. 2021. With Xinrui Feng and Mingxing Liu. [pdf]
This paper presents one of the first studies of the political behavior of female members of China's national legislature---the National People's Congress (NPC). Female legislators have consistently held about 20% of seats in the NPC in the past two decades because of a gender quota, but they sponsor about 44% of all legislative bills and more than half of bills relevant to women's rights and interests in the 12th NPC. Among sponsors, women on average sponsor more bills (4.8 bills) than men (3.1 bills). We propose three potential mechanisms that drive women's comparative productiveness: (i) women are more collaborative than their male colleagues; (ii) the gender quota and non-Communist Party quota produce a particularly active female group; and (iii) female leadership encourages female participation. We next analyze 2,365 bills submitted during the 12th NPC and show that female legislators are not only more engaged in women's issues; they are also disproportionately more active than men in the traditionally ``male dominated'' areas including economics and finance, foreign affairs, rural affairs and environmental issues. Our findings suggest that a socialist legacy alone does not narrow the political gender gap; underrepresented regime outsiders (women) have strategically used the ``double-quota'' system and collaborated to carve out a place to amplify their voices, outperform insiders, and shape the policy debate.
Political Decisions in a Low Information Environment: Local Leadership Turnover and Firm Subsidies in China. 2021. With Siyao Li. [ssrn][pdf]
How do new politicians distribute government resources in regimes with no electoral considerations? We argue that when the payoffs are not immediately clear in a low information environment, politicians use heuristics to make decisions that minimize political risks. We propose that for new local politicians, firm ownership types serve as a useful source of informational shortcuts to evaluating political importance, and this decision making process benefits state-owned firms. Using firm-level subsidies data in China combined with leadership turnover data at the provincial level from 2007 to 2015, we find that new provincial governors, immediately after taking office, distribute a significantly smaller proportion of subsidies to private firms relative to state-owned enterprises. The effect gradually attenuates as new governors understand local conditions and establish connections with local private firms. This strategy also proves to be politically effective, with governors who adopt such a strategy more likely to be promoted at the end of their tenure.
Ethnic Discrimination and Authoritarian Rule: An Analysis of Criminal Sentencing in China. 2020. With Rory Truex. [ssrn][pdf]
This paper presents the first analysis of ethnic discrimination in sentencing patterns in the People's Republic of China, focusing on drug cases in Yunnan province. We posit the "problem minority" hypothesis, which holds that discrimination in an authoritarian system emerges when an ethnic group becomes associated with behavior that generates social instability. On average, minority defendants in Yunnan have sentences that are about 1.4 to 7.5 months longer than Han defendants that have committed similar drug crimes. Further analysis of data from all provinces reveals that this bias is largest for groups heavily involved in the drug trade, and in provinces with significant minority populations and drugs.
The Evolving Relationship between the Party and the Private Sector in the Xi Era. 2021. [pdf] (book chapter for edited volume The Party at 100)
This review essay evaluates the evolving relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the private sector with a focus on the Xi era. I argue that Xi's policy towards the private sector does not fundamentally depart from the previous two administrations. Since Xi took office, there has been a stronger party presence in the private sector, but not necessarily more direct influence in their business operations. While SOEs still enjoy favorable treatment, private firms have grown more profitable, more innovative, and more competitive globally. Statistics on the private sector growth show clear continuity instead of disruption, and a new wave of privately-owned national champions has emerged. As the party enters into its second century, it will continue to face serious challenges in further developing and managing the private sector. The party will have no choice but to deepen its market-oriented reform.
Protecting Property through Political Office in China. 2018. [pdf] [appendix]
How do entrepreneurs protect their property and grow their businesses in systems without secure property rights? I argue that Chinese private entrepreneurs seek public office to protect their property from government predation. Drawing on rich empirical evidence including in-depth interviews and a unique national survey, I show how Chinese entrepreneurs deter local officials from demanding bribes, ad hoc taxes, and other types of informal payments by securing seats in the local legislature and using their political titles to signal political capital. Using a national survey of Chinese private entrepreneurs from 2000 to 2012, I show that entrepreneurs who serve in the local legislature spend an average of 14.5% less on informal payments to local governments. A simple signaling game further demonstrates how entrepreneurs use their political titles to signal strong political capital and deter expropriation
This paper presents one of the first studies of the political behavior of female members of China's national legislature---the National People's Congress (NPC). Female legislators have consistently held about 20% of seats in the NPC in the past two decades because of a gender quota, but they sponsor about 44% of all legislative bills and more than half of bills relevant to women's rights and interests in the 12th NPC. Among sponsors, women on average sponsor more bills (4.8 bills) than men (3.1 bills). We propose three potential mechanisms that drive women's comparative productiveness: (i) women are more collaborative than their male colleagues; (ii) the gender quota and non-Communist Party quota produce a particularly active female group; and (iii) female leadership encourages female participation. We next analyze 2,365 bills submitted during the 12th NPC and show that female legislators are not only more engaged in women's issues; they are also disproportionately more active than men in the traditionally ``male dominated'' areas including economics and finance, foreign affairs, rural affairs and environmental issues. Our findings suggest that a socialist legacy alone does not narrow the political gender gap; underrepresented regime outsiders (women) have strategically used the ``double-quota'' system and collaborated to carve out a place to amplify their voices, outperform insiders, and shape the policy debate.
Political Decisions in a Low Information Environment: Local Leadership Turnover and Firm Subsidies in China. 2021. With Siyao Li. [ssrn][pdf]
How do new politicians distribute government resources in regimes with no electoral considerations? We argue that when the payoffs are not immediately clear in a low information environment, politicians use heuristics to make decisions that minimize political risks. We propose that for new local politicians, firm ownership types serve as a useful source of informational shortcuts to evaluating political importance, and this decision making process benefits state-owned firms. Using firm-level subsidies data in China combined with leadership turnover data at the provincial level from 2007 to 2015, we find that new provincial governors, immediately after taking office, distribute a significantly smaller proportion of subsidies to private firms relative to state-owned enterprises. The effect gradually attenuates as new governors understand local conditions and establish connections with local private firms. This strategy also proves to be politically effective, with governors who adopt such a strategy more likely to be promoted at the end of their tenure.
Ethnic Discrimination and Authoritarian Rule: An Analysis of Criminal Sentencing in China. 2020. With Rory Truex. [ssrn][pdf]
This paper presents the first analysis of ethnic discrimination in sentencing patterns in the People's Republic of China, focusing on drug cases in Yunnan province. We posit the "problem minority" hypothesis, which holds that discrimination in an authoritarian system emerges when an ethnic group becomes associated with behavior that generates social instability. On average, minority defendants in Yunnan have sentences that are about 1.4 to 7.5 months longer than Han defendants that have committed similar drug crimes. Further analysis of data from all provinces reveals that this bias is largest for groups heavily involved in the drug trade, and in provinces with significant minority populations and drugs.
The Evolving Relationship between the Party and the Private Sector in the Xi Era. 2021. [pdf] (book chapter for edited volume The Party at 100)
This review essay evaluates the evolving relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the private sector with a focus on the Xi era. I argue that Xi's policy towards the private sector does not fundamentally depart from the previous two administrations. Since Xi took office, there has been a stronger party presence in the private sector, but not necessarily more direct influence in their business operations. While SOEs still enjoy favorable treatment, private firms have grown more profitable, more innovative, and more competitive globally. Statistics on the private sector growth show clear continuity instead of disruption, and a new wave of privately-owned national champions has emerged. As the party enters into its second century, it will continue to face serious challenges in further developing and managing the private sector. The party will have no choice but to deepen its market-oriented reform.
Protecting Property through Political Office in China. 2018. [pdf] [appendix]
How do entrepreneurs protect their property and grow their businesses in systems without secure property rights? I argue that Chinese private entrepreneurs seek public office to protect their property from government predation. Drawing on rich empirical evidence including in-depth interviews and a unique national survey, I show how Chinese entrepreneurs deter local officials from demanding bribes, ad hoc taxes, and other types of informal payments by securing seats in the local legislature and using their political titles to signal political capital. Using a national survey of Chinese private entrepreneurs from 2000 to 2012, I show that entrepreneurs who serve in the local legislature spend an average of 14.5% less on informal payments to local governments. A simple signaling game further demonstrates how entrepreneurs use their political titles to signal strong political capital and deter expropriation
