

# Violence Exposure and Support for State Use of Force in a Non-Democracy\*

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## **Abstract**

How do individuals respond to internal security threats in non-democracies? Does violence make individuals more supportive of a strong state? Are the effects of violence on individual attitudes uniform, or are they heterogeneous with respect to the identity of the perpetrators? We field an online survey experiment on a national sample of Chinese citizens, in which respondents were randomly selected to view reports on violent acts in China. We show that exposure to violence makes individuals more supportive of a strong state: respondents randomly exposed to violence are more likely to approve police use of lethal force, and this effect is particularly strong among the less wealthy Han Chinese. We also find suggestive evidence that individuals exhibit intergroup biases in their reaction to violence.

Governments facing internal security threats sometimes enact policies that undercut civil liberties (Davenport 1995). Citizens' commitment to civil liberties may also conflict with other important values or concerns such as national security, equality, and law and order (Peffley, Knigge and Hurwitz 2001; Sniderman et al. 1996). After the September 11 attack, for instance, many Americans were willing to trade off civil liberties for greater personal safety (Davis and Silver 2004). When the perceived threat from terrorism increases, individuals are much more likely to support wiretaps without a warrant, video cameras in public places, and other government measures that strengthen state power (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, Chapter 6). Other micro-level studies have also shown that violent or terror attacks make individuals more likely to participate in future elections (Balcells and Torrats-Espinosa 2018); more likely to vote for right-leaning parties (Berrebi and Klor 2008); more supportive of policies advocated by political leaders (Gadarian 2010); and more anxious about outgroups (Panagopoulos 2006).

Most of these studies speak to the effect of violence on the electorate in democracies. Yet violent or terror attacks occur in non-democracies as well, and we have limited understanding of their effects (Hou 2017). In the case of authoritarian regimes where the government may not be as responsive to citizen demands, how might acts of violence influence public opinion and policy outcomes?

To answer this question, we implemented an online survey experiment on a national sample of Chinese citizens, in which respondents were randomly selected to view reports on real violent acts in China. We focus on internal violence by controlling for the nationalities of perpetrators, and we further specify internal violence by differentiating types of targets, that is, whether targets of violence are citizens or elites. In light of findings in the civil war literature that civilians possess strong intergroup biases (Lyall, Blair and Imai 2013), we ask whether in peaceful times individuals' reaction to violence is also shaped by identity and intergroup biases. We find that exposure to violent acts makes individuals more supportive of a strong state: respondents randomly exposed to violence are more likely to approve police use of lethal force. Subgroup analysis reveals that this effect is particularly strong among the less wealthy Chinese. We also find suggestive evidence that individuals exhibit intergroup biases when reacting to violence.

This article contributes to the literature on violence and public opinion in non-democracies. It extends existing studies of the effect of violence on political attitudes to an authoritarian context. Scholars have traditionally focused on measuring voter sensitivity to violent attacks in democratic

contexts. We believe it is also important to study the effect of violence on attitudes in authoritarian contexts, especially in light of an emerging literature that challenges the assumption that authoritarian leaders ignore public opinion (e.g., [Distelhorst and Hou 2017](#); [Lorentzen, 2013](#); [Shirk 2014](#)) and the unfortunate trend of growing terror attacks in authoritarian countries.

## Background

Among the 55 official “ethnic minority” groups recognized by the Chinese state, Uyghurs are increasingly associated with ethnic violence in the public perception. There are around 11 million Uyghurs, distinguishable from the ethnic majority Han Chinese in terms of language and religion. Nonetheless, most Han Chinese see Uyghurs as Chinese citizens and part of the Chinese state ([Bovingdon 2014](#)). In recent years, violent incidents have occurred in China with increasing frequency, especially in the northwestern Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, where the majority of the Uyghur Muslim population reside ([Potter and Wang 2018](#)).<sup>1</sup> The 2014 Kunming attack, where eight black-clad assailants killed 29 people with knives and machetes at a railway station in the southwestern city of Kunming, was the first time Uyghurs were accused of a major organized attack outside Xinjiang.

The Chinese government has responded to the growing violent attacks with heightened control. Through the “Strike Hard” campaign, the government closely observes religious activities and festivals, monitors Muslims returning from their studies in Islamic schools overseas, arrests and executes suspected terrorists, reinvigorates a system of informants, and recruits minority cadres to the Party and government ([Chung 2006](#)). After the 2014 Kunming knife attack, China’s security chief, Meng Jianzhu, vowed “all-out efforts” to severely punish terrorists. The state immediately implemented a new policy of preemptive shooting which stipulated that “special police officers, when encountering perpetrators of violence, do not have to follow the procedures of ‘identifying themselves and firing warning shots,’ instead, they can execute criminals on the spot.” Armed troops were seen on the streets of many Chinese cities shortly after the attack. Hundreds of suspects were arrested

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<sup>1</sup>Some of these incidents include the 1992 Urumqi bombings, the 1997 Urumqi bus bombings, the 2009 ethnic riot in Urumqi, the 2017 Xinjiang knife attack, and outside of Xinjiang, the 2014 Kunming knife attack. Also see [Distelhorst and Hou \(2014\)](#) for more details.

and more than a dozen suspects were executed in 2014.<sup>2</sup> These new security measures, although rendering civil liberties at risk, have been welcomed by many Han Chinese.<sup>3</sup> Unsurprisingly, these measures are disproportionately applied in areas with a large number of Uyghurs. It is argued that the extent and reach of the security apparatus in Xinjiang is “utterly alien to an average Han Chinese” outside the area (Potter 2013). In our study, we measure individuals’ support for one of these new security measures—the preemptive shooting policy, which significantly enhances police authority to use lethal force on civilian suspects.

## Research Design

We conducted an online survey experiment in China in August 2015 to understand how individuals react to violence perpetrated by co-nationals of different ethnicities. Through a popular Chinese crowdsourcing website similar to Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, we recruited 1,357 respondents throughout the country.<sup>4</sup> Respondents recruited from this platform are similar to respondents recruited by major organizations and companies who run online panels in China (see Table A1). While our sample is not a probability sample representative of the Chinese population, surveying the online Chinese population is informative and valuable for our research objectives. First, given institutional and technological constraints (Huang 2015), a nationally representative survey in China would involve face-to-face interviews, a method which can be problematic because we are interested in politically sensitive questions such as support for government policies. Second, Chinese netizens are at the forefront of open public discourse, and they are younger, wealthier, better educated, and more likely to be living in urban areas (Truex 2017). Scholars have argued that these young and educated internet users constitute the present and future middle class, whose

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<sup>2</sup>See Phillips (2014). Wang (2014) provides a systematic discussion on how the Chinese Communist Party has empowered the police force.

<sup>3</sup>Very few publicly question the legitimacy or liberty-compromising elements of these measures, and most individuals express support for these policies. Online commentaries such as the following are quite common: “We should use all possible means to kill the terrorists” (<http://goo.gl/KUU4uN>, comment following news report); “They (Uyghur suspects of Yunnan terror attack) should all be executed;” “Life sentence would be too light. They should all receive death penalty;” (<http://goo.gl/YHAU7e>) “We should use the strongest measure to deal with violent terrorists” (<http://goo.gl/pkYY1A>). All accessed April 29, 2016.

<sup>4</sup>Respondents were directed to a US-based website to take the survey anonymously. Each unique IP address and account at the recruiting platform was allowed to participate only once and could quit at any time during the survey. For other research using a similar platform, see Huang (2015), Huang (2018) and Li, Shi and Zhu (2018).

political attitudes are likely to matter more in the policy making process (Easterly 2001).

Of all respondents, 93.5% are Han Chinese, 2.5% are Muslim Chinese, and 4% come from other ethnic groups. We focus on the attitudes of the Han Chinese respondents, because the number of respondents from other ethnic groups is too small for any inference to be precise.

Each respondent was randomly assigned into one of the treatment groups or the control group. The *Violence-Uyghur* treatment is based on a real-life violent incident in China: the Kunming incident on March 1, 2014. This treatment used a vignette that focused on the main factual features of the incident:

[Group *Violence-Uyghur*] At 9pm on March 1st, 2014, violent knife attacks occurred at the Kunming rail station. According to the statistics collected by 5pm on March 2nd, 29 people were stabbed to death. 143 more individuals were injured, among whom 73 were heavily injured and 70 lightly injured.

In the treatment groups *Violence-Han1* and *Violence-Han2*, respondents read a description of a real recent violent attack committed by Han Chinese. The event described in *Violence-Han1* was similar to the *Violence-Uyghur* event in the total number of fatalities.

The incident described in *Violence-Han2* resulted in a smaller number of casualty but it was an attack targeting public officials. We use two different primes of violent events perpetrated by Han Chinese because we are interested in understanding whether the nature of the targets (i.e., citizens versus elites) has an impact on our dependent variable.<sup>5</sup> We included the perpetrators' names in the prompts to ensure respondents understood that these events were perpetrated by Han Chinese.

[Group *Violence-Han1*] At 8pm on June 5th 2009, a perpetrator Zhang Yunliang set a bus on fire in Chengdu, Sichuan Province. The fire caused 28 deaths and many injuries.

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<sup>5</sup>The perpetrator who conducted the bombing described in *Violence-Han2* appeared to have received some support from individuals who hold a negative view of political elites. See netizen comments (in Chinese) following news report on this incident in a major Chinese newspaper at <http://www.infzm.com/content/48713>, accessed Oct.8, 2015.

[Group *Violence-Han2*] At 4pm on July 30th 2010, a bomb went off in a building in the tax bureau of Changsha, Hunan province. The perpetrator Liu Zhuiheng dropped the bomb under a conference room table in the tax bureau, causing 4 deaths and 19 injuries.<sup>6</sup>

These are all real-life events. We used the descriptions from actual and official news coverage of these incidents, which consistently emphasized the same set of objective facts. To make these three violence vignettes more comparable, we removed all subjective commentaries and condemnations from their original coverage. Note that in the *Violence-Uyghur* condition, the ethnicity of the attackers was not explicitly mentioned. We excluded their names for two reasons: first, among the three violent events, the Yunnan knife attack was the most recent and received the most extensive media coverage, and we assumed respondents were aware of the identities of the perpetrators; second, there were eight perpetrators in total, and including all of their names would have made this prompt significantly longer compared to the other two prompts.

Finally, we included a treatment group *Ethnicity*, in which respondents were not exposed to any description of violent events but only primed to think about their own ethnic identity. Here, we are interested in understanding whether priming ethnicity alone would induce any attitude change towards state use of force. Respondents in this group read a prompt adopted from a standard identity priming treatment (Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 2004):

[Group *Ethnicity*] People belong to different types of groups. One of the most important and essential of these groups is the ethnicity that you belong to. Each ethnicity is different. For example, you belong to the (dropdown) ethnicity.

To ensure that respondents read and register the experimental stimuli, the experimental screen was programmed with an enforced minimum of 10 seconds before a button appeared for the respondent to click and move on. Respondents randomized into the control group only saw a screen displaying

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<sup>6</sup>In these two groups, we kept the Han perpetrators' names to make sure respondents knew that these events were perpetrated by Han co-ethnics. The names of the perpetrators are different, but we do not believe this difference would have led to any difference in respondents' attitudes towards police use of lethal force.

“Please wait while the webpage loads.” Immediately after being exposed to a treatment condition or the control screen, respondents proceeded to the following question, which is our main dependent variable—support for police use of lethal force under the new preemptive shooting policy:

Recently, social conflict is on the rise. Would you support the following policy if it were to be proposed:

“Special police officers, when encountering a perpetrator of violence, do not have to follow the procedures of ‘identifying themselves and firing warning shots,’ instead, they can execute the other party on the spot.”

The response options are: (1) strongly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, (3) neutral, (4) somewhat agree, and (5) strongly agree. It is possible that respondents in the control group, although not exposed to the prompt, might have still associated the preemptive shooting policy description with the Yunnan knife attack, but such effect, if it exists at all, would only result in an underestimation of the true treatment effect. Finally, each respondent proceeded to a series of demographic questions.

Randomization checks show that respondents’ income, education level, marital status, and location do not predict respondents’ assignment to groups. Four Wald tests show that we cannot reject the null that in these models the covariates are simultaneously equal to zero, that is, they are unassociated with the treatment assignments (see Table A2).<sup>7</sup>

## Results

In general, there is substantial public support for police use of lethal force under the preemptive shooting policy. Among those in the control group, 9.44% strongly agree and 28.76% somewhat

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<sup>7</sup>We acknowledge that a “successful” randomization does not mean the conditions have to be alike in all aspects (Mutz, Pemantle and Pham 2017). In the appendix, we show results of OLS models including these covariates not because of the lack of balance, but because they are planned covariates to increase model efficiency (Mutz and Pemantle 2015).



agree with the policy. Respondents of other ethnic groups are dropped for all analyses and all remaining respondents are Han Chinese.

We pool the three violent events together, and find that the support for police use of lethal force increases by a significant 0.167 of a scale when respondents were exposed to the description of a violent attack. On a scale of 1-5 where the maximum change one can have is 4, a 0.167 increase represents a 4.2% change, which is substantively large ( $p=0.0386$ , one-sided;  $p=0.0771$ , two-sided). When respondents were exposed to the description of the Kunming knife attack, their support for police use of force increased by 0.224 of a scale. Meanwhile, when respondents were exposed to the other two violent events perpetrated by coethnics, they also become more supportive of state use of lethal force, but the effects are smaller. When respondents were not exposed to violence but simply primed of their own ethnicity, they also become slightly more supportive of the new policy. These results are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: The Effects of Violence or Ethnicity Prime on Support for Use of Lethal Force

Group	Treatment	Control	Difference
<b>Main Result: <i>Violence Exposure</i></b>	<b>3.084</b>	<b>2.917</b>	<b>0.167*</b>
	<b>(0.047)</b>	<b>(0.082)</b>	<b>(0.094)</b>
<i>N</i>	<b>619</b>	<b>205</b>	
(1) Exposure to <i>Violence-Uyghur</i>	3.141	2.917	0.224*
	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.116)
<i>N</i>	198	205	
(2) Exposure to <i>Violence-Han1</i>	3.055		0.138
	(0.082)		(0.116)
<i>N</i>	220		
(3) Exposure to <i>Violence-Han2</i>	3.059		0.142
	(0.079)		(0.113)
<i>N</i>	201		
(4) <i>Ethnicity Primed</i>	3.064		0.147
	(0.078)		(0.113)
<i>N</i>	219		

*Note.* Difference-in-means tests. All respondents are Han-Chinese. Ethnic minority respondents are excluded. Respondents who did not answer the dependent variable question, gave inconsistent answer regarding their ethnicities, or took more than 60 minutes to finish are excluded. Dependent variable: Support for police use of lethal force. Scale: 1 (least supportive) to 5 (most supportive). Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ , two-sided.

To answer the question of whether respondents react to violent events perpetrated by non-coethnics differently from those perpetrated by coethnics, we compare group means between Groups *Violence-Uyghur* and *Violence-Han1* and between *Violence-Uyghur* and *Violence-Han2*. Two difference-in-means tests (Table 2) show that these group means are not statistically distinguishable from each other, although in both comparisons individuals exposed to violence with non-coethnic attackers exhibit higher support on average. Note that the absence of perpetrators' ethnic identity in the *Violence-Uyghur* condition makes this prompt different from the other two prompts where the ethnicities of the perpetrators were explicit, and the absence could have led to an underestimate of an ethnic-outgroup effect. Another possibility is that these treatments are

under-powered, and thus we could not precisely estimate whether individuals exhibit intergroup biases when reacting to violence.

Table 2: The Effects of Violence on Support for Use of Lethal Force: Comparing Violence Treatment Groups

(1)	<i>Violence-Uyghur</i>	<i>Violence-Han1</i>	Difference
	3.141 (0.083)	3.055 (0.082)	0.087 (0.116)
<i>N</i>	198	201	
(2)	<i>Violence-Uyghur</i>	<i>Violence-Han2</i>	Difference
	3.141 (0.083)	3.059 (0.079)	0.082 (0.114)
<i>N</i>	198	220	

*Note.* \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ . Neither of these differences are statistically distinguishable from zero.

Finally, we consider whether different demographic subgroups respond to violence in different ways. Previous research suggests that citizens’ trust in government and expectation of government performance can depend on their social-economic status and political background (Truex 2017). Therefore, we divide our sample by income, education level, gender, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) membership, and estimate the conditional average treatment effect (CATE) for each subgroup.<sup>8</sup>

We again pool the three violent events together and examine how violence affects attitudes towards police use of lethal force. Our analysis indicates that respondents who are in the lower income bracket become much more supportive when exposed to violence. Their support for police use of lethal force increases by a statistically significant and substantially large 0.449 of a scale. The effect remains strong after multiple testing correction (two-sided  $p = 0.0011$ , group=4, Bonferroni

<sup>8</sup>We code respondents with annual household income below 8,000 *yuan* as low income, and otherwise high income. 8,000 *yuan* is slightly below sample mean, but our sample is a very young sample (therefore their income is relatively low). About 39.7% of the respondents are “low income.” Education is measured as whether a respondent has a college degree, and 49.5% of the respondents have a college degree. 15.90% of the respondents are CCP members. We also subdivide the group by gender because we find a strong effect of gender on support for the use of force in the OLS models (see Table A3).

$p$ -value cut point =  $0.05/4=0.0125$ ). On the other hand, there is no distinguishable heterogeneous treatment effects by gender, education, or CCP membership (Table A5). These findings suggest that the increased support for police use of force we identified earlier is mainly driven by the less wealthy. The effect among low-income respondents is partially driven by their lower support for police use of lethal force in the control condition, but why they are more likely to increase their support in the face of violence is a question that requires further research. Because our experiment was not originally designed to detect any particular source of effect heterogeneity, larger samples and a more targeted research design will be necessary to better identify variation in effect sizes across groups in future research (Coppock, Leeper and Mullinix 2018).

Taking these findings as a whole, we show that violence exposure makes Chinese citizens more supportive of government use of lethal force, and this effect is particularly strong among the less wealthy Han Chinese. We also find suggestive evidence that individuals' perception of threat and the resulting support for state use of lethal force may be influenced by intergroup biases.

## Discussion

In this paper, we find that citizens in China are sensitive to violent attacks perpetrated by both coethnics and non-coethnics, and they tend to react by strengthening their support for state use of lethal force. Public support for a hardline policy is worrisome, because such policies might reinforce fears, foment opposition to the government and inspire more violence (Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Krueger 2017). In China, a stronger security apparatus might further fuel existing grievances and entrench the divide “between a freer and more prosperous east and a security state in the west” (Potter 2013).

One direction for future research is to precisely estimate intergroup bias among individuals when reacting to violence. Another promising avenue is to study the effects of violent attacks on attitudes among the ethnic minorities in China, because their perceptions of the state and group security may diverge significantly from those of the ethnic majority. Extensions to this research may further pursue the mechanisms that underlie the changes in attitudes following exposure to violence. Besides self-reported public opinion data, future research may also consider using other types of data (e.g., government records in Hersh 2013) to understand how attitudes and behaviors are shaped by different types of violence.

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# Appendix

Table A1: Sample Comparison: Internet Survey Samples vs. Our Crowdsourcing Sample in China

Sample: Variable (mean)	1. Internet Survey Company	2. Chinese M-turk	3. The China Survey
Male	0.522	0.626	0.494
Age	37.672	25.853	31.72
Education(categorical)	5.529	5.279	.
Income	10.976	7.987	.
CCP member	0.234	0.159	0.205
Married	0.711	0.239	0.615
College degree or higher	0.599	0.405	.
Postgrad degree	0.066	0.029	.
Ethnicity	(percentage)	(percentage)	(percentage)
- Han	95.1%	93.5%	93.3%
- Zhuang	12.0%	2.1%	
- Man	12.0%	1.3%	
- Hui	10.0%	0.7%	
- Miao	1.0%	0.6%	
- Uyghur	1.0%	1.8%	
- Tibetan	0%	0%	

*Note.* Characteristics of panel subjects from a major internet survey company sample in column 1 are collected by the authors for a different project. Income (measured by annual family income) category: 1.below 3,000; 2.3,000-4,999; 3.5,000-6,999...; 4.10,000-199,999; 5.Above 200,000. Unit:*yuan*. Education category: 1. No education; 2. Elementary school; 3. Junior High; 4. Senior High; 5. Professional College; 6. College; 7. Graduate degree (masters); 8. PhD degree. The China Survey (column 3) refers to the 2008 China Survey cited in Truex (2017), which is a multistage probability spatial sampling and arguably represents the state of the art in terms of sampling quality in China.

Table A2: Randomization Checks: Regressing Individual Characteristics on Treatment Assignments

Treatment Group:	DV: Treatment Assignments			
	<i>Ethnicity</i>	<i>Violence-Uyghur</i>	<i>Violence-Han1</i>	<i>Violence-Han2</i>
Male	-0.058** (0.027)	0.019 (0.026)	-0.020 (0.026)	-0.002 (0.027)
Age	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.003)
Married	0.033 (0.033)	0.038 (0.032)	-0.024 (0.031)	0.000 (0.032)
CCP member	0.001 (0.037)	0.026 (0.035)	-0.083** (0.035)	-0.004 (0.036)
Region dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓
Education dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	✓	✓	✓	✓
R-squared	0.050	0.045	0.068	0.048
Observations	1,078	1,078	1,078	1,078
Wald Test <i>p</i> -value	0.4898	0.9177	0.3267	0.4246

*Note.* Entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Region, income, and education dummies are included. The *p*-value from Omnibus Wald tests are shown in the last row. In each test, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the covariates in the model are simultaneously equal to zero, i.e., they are unassociated with the treatment assignment. \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.10$

Table A3: The Effects of Violence or Ethnicity Prime on Support for Use of Lethal Force (OLS)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	<i>Violence</i>	<i>Violence-Uyghur</i>	<i>Violence-Han1</i>	<i>Violence-Han2</i>	<i>Ethnicity</i>
Treatment effect	0.191** (0.097)	0.286** (0.122)	0.196 (0.123)	0.174 (0.118)	0.193 (0.118)
Male	0.266** (0.085)	0.301** (0.122)	0.237* (0.129)	0.385** (0.122)	0.376** (0.120)
Age	-0.002 (0.008)	0.003 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.011)	0.011 (0.009)	0.010 (0.009)
College degree	0.057 (0.084)	0.100 (0.119)	0.017 (0.124)	0.057 (0.122)	0.019 (0.119)
Married	0.226** (0.107)	0.277* (0.145)	0.445** (0.155)	0.194 (0.147)	0.060 (0.145)
CCP member	0.206* (0.113)	0.303** (0.150)	0.401** (0.168)	0.014 (0.163)	0.086 (0.164)
High income	-0.066 (0.083)	0.061 (0.118)	0.120 (0.119)	-0.006 (0.119)	0.241** (0.119)
Region dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	2.381 (0.340)	1.870 (0.436)	2.471 (0.468)	2.375 (0.412)	2.171 (0.394)
Observations	798	390	393	413	415
R-squared	0.082	0.161	0.125	0.119	0.137

*Note.* OLS estimation of the effects of violent attacks or ethnic priming on support for police use of lethal force. The first model pools all three violent events together. All respondents are Han-Chinese. Control variables included. College degree is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if a respondent has a college education or higher. High income is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if a respondent's income is higher or equal to the mean income in the sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The positive effect of CCP membership on support for use of force corroborates the inter-group bias assumption. CCP members who are regime insiders exhibit higher support. \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table A4: The Effects of Violence or Ethnicity Prime on Support for Use of Lethal Force (Ordered Logistic Regressions)

	(1) <i>Violence</i>	(2) <i>Violence-Uyghur</i>	(3) <i>Violence-Han1</i>	(4) <i>Violence-Han2</i>	(5) <i>Ethnicity</i>
Treatment effect	0.295* (0.154)	0.444** (0.203)	0.326 (0.201)	0.259 (0.189)	0.319* (0.191)
Male	0.435** (0.137)	0.517** (0.202)	0.419** (0.213)	0.630** (0.200)	0.651** (0.200)
Age	-0.002 (0.014)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.018)	0.016 (0.016)	0.016 (0.016)
College degree	0.077 (0.135)	0.169 (0.197)	0.025 (0.206)	0.074 (0.199)	0.060 (0.200)
Married	0.351** (0.176)	0.475* (0.248)	0.725** (0.251)	0.327 (0.241)	0.111 (0.248)
CCP membership	0.315* (0.177)	0.497** (0.247)	0.620** (0.267)	-0.008 (0.263)	0.147 (0.272)
High income	-0.113 (0.131)	0.068 (0.192)	0.186 (0.188)	-0.027 (0.191)	0.381** (0.191)
Region dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant cut1	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant cut2	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant cut3	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant cut4	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	798	390	393	413	415

*Note.* Ordered logistic estimations of the effects of violent attacks or ethnic priming on support for police use of lethal force. The first model pools all three violent events together. All respondents are Han-Chinese. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table A5: The Effects of Violence on Support for Use of Lethal Force: Conditional Average Treatment Effects (CATE)

Subgroup	Treatment Mean	Control Mean	Difference	Two-sided $p$ -Val	N
High income	3.015	3.091	-0.076	0.5582	444
Low income	3.165	2.716	0.449	0.0011	380
CCP membership	3.253	3.105	0.147	0.5226	129
No CCP membership	3.058	2.871	0.187	0.0754	679
College degree	3.105	2.927	0.178	0.2188	400
No college degree	3.063	2.908	0.155	0.2126	424
Male	3.165	3.021	0.144	0.2298	527
Female	2.948	2.692	0.256	0.0848	295

*Note.* Dependent Variable: Support for Police Use of Lethal Force Scale: 1 (least supportive) to 5 (most supportive). Here, the treatment is “violence exposure” and it pools three violence treatment prompts into one treatment group.  $p$ -values are based on two-sided t-tests.